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           "I Opened the Gate": 
Benjy's Non-Understanding of Physical Causation 
                                Kohei Sawabe 
 Ineke Bockting takes Benjy Compson's lack of understanding 
regarding transitive constructions in English, as evinced in that 
part of the text of the novel The Sound and the Fury by William 
Faulkner that is supposedly a transcript of this thirty-three-year-
old child's inner psyche, as an indication of his cognitive fac-
ulty's failing to comprehend the world around him in causal 
terms: 
   His[Benjy's] text suggests, through the virtual absence of 
   transitive constructions, that Benjy does not completelyun-
   derstand the relations between objects, and between objects 
   and their actions; his world is one of separate ntities, ac-
   tions and events without connections of, for instance, respon-
   sibility, participation, authority, incentive, submission, or 
   cause and effect. (Bockting 45) 
 In the following scene, he is estimated to be between fifteen 
and sixteen years of age and the sister he loves and who loved 
him back has already left the home and one of his daily routines 
consists in chasing little  schoolgirls on their way home by run-
ning parallel to them, he inside the fence, they out on the side-
walk. On this particular day, however, his conniving older 
brother Jason left the gate unlatched and Benjy as a result acci-
dentally ends up getting out and grabbing at the girls, one of the 
less than unsavory consequences of which was his being cas-
trated, for his act was deemed sexually motivated: 
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   They came on. I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. 
   I was trying to say, and I caught her, trying to say,and she 
   screamed and I was trying to say. (SF 53) 
In this excerpt, there are three sentences which ostensibly have 
Benjy's "I" as their subject pronoun. The reason we are interested 
in these sentences i that they seem to involve the notion of cau-
sation in some essential manner. The fact of Benjy's mental ut-
terance of them, therefore, arguably implies his understanding 
causality, thus immediately contradicting Bockting's claim above, 
or so it appears. 
 Most, if not all, sentences with transitive verbs can be taken 
to have an underlying causal structure be it explicitly or less ob-
viously: the subject is the cause and the object is the effect 
'caused' by the activity named by the verb. To this extent there 
is a prima facie evidence against Bockting's position because the 
three sentences above are formally transitive. Furthermore, if we 
are acquainted with the dichotomy of physical versus mental 
causations, it would be a straightforward observation that 'I 
opened the gate' falls in the former kind while 'I was trying to 
say' into the latter. Without any expertise in causal theories, 
however, it is presumed that we should be able to intuitively ap-
preciate the basic contrast between the two: opening of the gate 
is merely an event, and in itself there is nothing more to it; try-
ing to say, on the other hand, presupposes the subject of 
conation and that of representation, as much as speaking is an 
act of representing one's cognitive content in a form accessible 
to others. For the reason mainly of space, however, we will not 
further investigate 'I was trying to say' in this paper. 
 Let us, then, consider 'I opened the gate.' One might, even 
while acceding to the argument in the previous paragraph that 
opening of the gate by and in itself does not commit us to any-
thing more than the fact that the very event described happened
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(without, to wit, implying anything about its doer or the doer's 
ontological status: the gate may sometimes open by itself, or 
whatever it is that opens it could be something very remote from 
ever bearing the kind of mentality required for by mental causa-
tion), still see in the completed phrase a definite sense of mental 
something because of the adjunct pronoun  "I." And this is not 
without justification: we do from such sentences read off the in-
tention of the "I" and attribute it back as the cause (of mental 
causation) of the act of opening the gate. This very natural intui-
tion is, however, very much in doubt in the case of Benjy as we 
explain in due time. 
 We must however digress first and address the issue of first-
person versus third-person dichotomy and what effect it has on 
the attribution of intention. 
 Let us take for instance a pair of sentences: 'I am trying to 
stand up straight' and 'He is trying to stand up straight.' In both 
cases we seem to attribute the respective subject he very same 
intention, the conative one of coordinating one's body core mus-
culature in such a way to achieve a certain posture. Yet the very 
sameness of the attributum must not be allowed to conceal the 
 fundamentally distinct nature of the processes by which we arrive 
at this attribution. In the former, when we say 'I am trying to 
stand up straight,' what grounds the truth of this statement is the 
very intention we have of holding that posture so and our intro-
spective awareness of this same intention. Whether we may be 
deceived in believing that we have that intention and that we 
may be aware of it merely thanks to some malignant spirit as 
Descartes worried is not the point here: whether correctly or in-
correctly, we do have and are aware of the intention and this 
fact warrants us in attributing to the first-person subject he in-
tention identified. In case of the third-person subject sentence, we 
have no such recourse to introspection and the attribution of the
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intention to stand up straight, or more precisely, the trying of 
standing up straight, is only presumptive, and in contrast o the 
first-person case, even without Descartes' malicious demon, it 
may very well be faulty: perhaps he (the third-person) is merely 
mocking us by pretending to be trying to stand up straight while 
in reality he needs no trying, he can stand up straight without 
any effort; or perhaps he is a mime practicing his routine; or he 
is attempting to win our sympathy for whatever unknown mo-
tives. Thus there is an unmistakable asymmetry between the first-
person and the third-person attribution of intention, primarily due 
to the unbridgeable chasm separating the  self  s capacity for intro-
spection and the others' mere guessing-work. 
 Coming back to the problem of Benjy's use of the pronoun "I" 
in 'I opened the gate,' one reason why we must be cautious in 
considering it as conferring upon the sentence a sense of the 
first-person i tention is the fact of its subject being the very one 
who is supposed to be the Other of the novel, somebody whose 
mind works differently than the rest of us, the one with unnatu-
ral abilities and / or disabilities (just think of his phenomenal 
echolalia talent to remember all that he recites in his head of 
what happened in the past three  decades). In other words, how 
can we talk about intentions if the alleged intender is an idiot? 
Another perhaps much graver objection, however, is now at hand 
from the point raised in the above  digressionary paragraph. 
Combing carefully through the text, we discover that in it there 
is only one other instance where the verbal complex open the 
gate appears, and approximately three more fairly similar ones 
with open the door. In none of them, however, the subject is 
Benjy, that is, they are all third-person subject sentences (readers 
unfamiliar with the novel need reminding perhaps that the entire 
chapter in question is told in interior monologue where every in-
stance of "I," which is not part of quoted sequences, formally
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refers to  Benjy). This is to say that all the instances and near 
instances of open the gate are the ones where the attribution of 
the subject's intention is at best presumptive and not definitive. 
This opens the way for a skeptic, a reductionist about Benjy's 
pseudo-intentions, let us say, to argue that the present case with 
the first pronoun "I" too can be explained in a manner not in-
voking the introspective mental activity inside Benjy's brain. 
 Summing up the arguments presented in the last three para-
graphs, we first confirmed that open the gate by itself is non-
committal as to its having a causer or not, nor is there entailed 
anything about its status, i.e., we might even be ignorant of 
whether it has a mind or not. Secondly, we acknowledged that 
the addition of the pronoun "I," however, seemingly promotes the 
neutral status of the verbal complex to one high enough to host 
a consciousness, or in any case something resembling intentions. 
Thirdly, this promotion, actually, appears to be in jeopardy for 
two reasons: first because he may be an idiot devoid of con-
sciousness, and second, because all the other instances of the 
verbal complex (similar enough) are predicated of third-person 
pronouns and therefore our particular example at hand, happening 
to be a unique one, might be explained away as an exception. 
 Now we move on to consider what actually takesplace when 
we say we identify and locate intentions in our actions, i.e., in 
our use of the first-person sentences to predicate of ourselves in-
tentional states causing actions. Take the example of open the 
door. What is the role of opened the door in 'I opened the door 
and entered'? Or, if subscribing to Wittgensteinian otion of 
'meaning is use,' what is its function? We claim that it has no 
robust meaning here; it is quasi-automatic o say 'I opened the 
door' when the door is shut and my intention is to enter. 
Differently put, in the context of a  shut door and my intending 
to go in, we have no choice but to use the verb open in order
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to sound neutral (kicked open or blasted open would introduce 
connotations not sought  for): the choice of the verb to the object 
in the circumstance given, i. e., the pragmatics of collocation, is 
dictated and determined by the linguistic custom; it is a form of 
 cliché, in a manner of speaking. 
 If the claim in the above paragraph is not too far off the 
mark, and opened the door does not have a robust meaning, 
what other meaning or intentions are there in I opened the door 
and entered? Obvious. The intention of going-in, of entering. We 
may, therefore, be justified in positing the following claim: in 
the context of where the intention to go beyond the door is pre-
sent, and the door is shut (we might add quite innocuously also 
the condition that the door is easily open-able,  i. e., no unusual ef-
fort nor attention is required to open it) and we are given the 
phrase 'I opened the door  and  .  .  .  '  any amount of intention that 
may be presumed because of the pronoun "I" is located with the 
act of going beyond the door, entering for example, and the ac-
tual act of opening the door neither attracts intention or carries 
any robust meaning. If we accept his claim, there seems to be 
no reason not to accept, mutatis mutandis, the corresponding 
claim about I opened the gate. And in the actual example we are 
considering, as we learned from the schoolgirl-accosting-scene 
excerpt, Benjy's intention was clearly to follow the girls as 
closely as possible, i.e., towards outside, beyond the fences. In 
this case, then, the phrase opened the gate literally carries no 
weight, it has no robust meaning in  itself; it is rather an indicator 
or a marker keeping track of Benjy's path, to tell the reader that 
he got out of the yard through the gate (that we learn later was 
unlatched) and he did not jump over the fence nor broke through 
it. With this interpretation i  mind, and supposing it justified, we 
may propose as its corollary the following rewriting of the sen-
tence, using different verbs but arguably still capturing the
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essence of what is happening: 'I went out, the gate was in the 
way, I went through it.' Note that all the verbs used in this re-
writing are intransitive; therefore Bockting, in any event, has one 
fewer reason to object to this, if she were to object to it at all. 
 Stepping back a little, we now glance at what fleshing-in can 
be done to one of the points made earlier that we should deny 
attributing any intentions to Benjy because he is an idiot, what-
ever semantic load this term may be carrying. There is a scene 
which may be instructive to this end, where there is a definite 
sense of uncertainty in the level of self-awareness Benjy might/or 
might not possess: at the least, he seems not to be in control of 
all of his actions, nor is he in touch with all of his perceptions 
as 'his,' apparently. It is when he burnt himself: 
   My hand jerked back and I put it in my mouth and Dilsey 
   caught me. I could still hear the clock between my voice. 
   Dilsey reached back and hit Luster on the head. My voice 
   was going loud every time. 
   "Get that soda." Dilsey said. She took my hand out of my 
   mouth. My voice went louder then and my hand tried to go 
   back to my mouth, but Dilsey held it. My voice went loud. 
  (SF 59) 
We note here that his hand and voice are described as if acting 
on their own volition, independent of him. The control over his 
hand's movement still lies within his "I" in the first line: we see 
that it is "I" who puts the hand in 'my' mouth. That mastery, ap-
parently, fades in the second paragraph as his voice begins to 
want to 'go loud' and his hand 'tries to go back' to his mouth. 
Besides Dilsey and Luster, here emerge three subjects apparent: 
Benjy, Benjy's voice and Benjy's burnt hand. Faced with such a 
picture, it may be tempting to reach the idiot-Benjy conclusion 
by arguing in the following manner:
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Benjy's lack of speech and his apparent mental age (of a three-
year  old), coupled with what we easily observe in the scenes 
such as above, indicate quite a primitive state of consciousness 
and compound our suspicion that we may not actually have a 
referent for his use of "I," at least not in the normal way that 
pronoun is impregnated with the sense of self-aware go which 
is aware that it is aware; a fortiori, therefore, no intentional 
states can be ascribed to him. (Hence may also originate the not-
uncommon allusions to his near animal-like xistence, both in the 
text and by the critics.) 
  Where this chain of argument may break down, its weakest 
link, as it were, is where the blanket denial of his ability to be 
ever intentional at all is issued from the fact that the normal and 
competent use of the pronoun  "I" is inseparably the sine-qua-non 
of a self-aware subject of experience (see Lowe), the Self, the  "I," or Ego, which Benjy evidently lacks, judging from the above 
quoted passage: if the subject of experience does not even recog-
nize his voice or hand as his own, it is not really the subject of 
consciousness, it is only a subject of consciousness which is sick 
and, sadly, compromised. 
 One might object to this link, calling in question if it is in-
deed utterly impossible for someone or something with less than 
completely unified (comparable, perhaps to Kant's notion of ap-
perception) sense of self to have any intentional states whatso-
ever. Thus formulated, the objection seems to command serious 
attention. We will not try to meet it, however, for the reasons 
first that there is a more threatening objection which we will ad-
dress next. And secondly that the denying Benjy of all intention-
alities is not the ultimate conclusion this paper arrives at in the 
end; as such it is a sweeping eneralization too broad to success-
fully defend. The conclusion that will be actually defended, in 
contrast, is to deny Benjy only a specific form of intentionality,
           Kohei Sawabe 61 
the sort that is predicated on his comprehending causality. 
 A grave objection may be leveled against our, let us say, 
Benjy's-incompetence thesis by anyone who, having read the 
page preceding the very first excerpt we quoted from the text, 
noticed the following lines: 
   It was open when I touched it, and I held to it in the twi-
   light. I wasn't crying, and I tried to stop, watching the girls 
   coming along in the twilight. (SF 52) 
The objector would argue as follows. First, the very first sen-
tence up to the comma is tantamount to his confessing that he 
recognized that it was open. Second, for him to have recognized 
that it was open, naturally, he had to be able to know or under-
stand what it is for it to be open. Thirdly, to know or understand 
what it is for it to be open is precisely to know  / understand how 
it causally comes about to be open. And finally, from all of the 
above, therefore, Benjy understands the causal mechanism of 
how the gate opens. 
 Upon closer inspection, there are several instances of faulty in-
ference and shortcuts in the above line of reasoning. Before we 
start to unearth those mistakes, however, we should note a small 
and perhaps trivial looking point which in fact is quite crucial 
and cannot be conceded to our opponents. It is that the sentence 
'It was open when I touched it' allows only one possible inter-
pretation in the given context in so far as the question of how 
he came to know the gate's being open is concerned: by touch, 
namely. It is through his tactual perception (or more precisely, 
through his prioperception, more on this below) that he came to 
know that the gate was open. And it cannot be otherwise: for 
example, by his visually registering that the bolt of the latch was 
not in, or by simply noticing that the gate was ajar, etc. The for-
mer possibility is excluded because if he understands the
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mechanism of the latching to such an extent, then he should be 
able to go out of the yard whenever he so wished. The latter 
possibility is unlikely because if so (and this point in fact applies 
to the former possibility as well) it would mean that he visually 
registered the aperture between the gate and the rest of the 
fences, implying that his attention at least for that moment was 
directed away from the girls outside to whom his entranced gaze 
was supposed to be glued. This is a much less attractive inter-
pretation than the one where he, following the movement of the 
girls passing-by by sliding himself sideways while holding onto 
and unceasingly looking through the fence, realizes the gate was 
open because it starts to give way due to his body weight. 
Perhaps, a quick way to summarize is that when we use the ad-
verbial phrase when I touched it in such circumstances we do so 
simply in order to imply that that (by touch) is how we came to 
learn that it was open. 
  As is obvious from the more attractive interpretation elaborated 
on in the last paragraph, this tactual perceiving of the gate's un-
latched state can be a little more exactly described as 
prioperceptively coming to find out something, that is, by mo-
mentarily losing balance (because that portion of the fence which 
is movable, the gate, gave way) his body recognized that the 
kind of resistance it was used to (from the innumerable times 
when he cried holding onto the un-budging fence) is no longer 
present, and that thus it can lunge forward towards the open 
space where the girls are. 
 One way to describe the sequence, making explicit the inter-
pretation put forward above, may be the following: 'It started to 
open when I leaned on  it.'. In comparing this to the original, 'It 
was open when I touched it,' it may be feared that we would in-
troduce a substantial  non  justifiable change by replacing the de-
scription of a state (that it was open) by that of a movement (of
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starting to  open). Such worries are misplaced, however, if we 
carefully examine what is really involved. First of all, we already 
ascertained that it is not the case that the gate was ajar nor does 
Benjy mean by it was open that he observed visually that it was 
unlocked. All that is implied by the original description is that 
it was unlatched which can be detected if you put weight onto 
it. Secondly, though perhaps a minor point, but the fact of his 
choice of the verb touch should not be overemphasized; it is not 
that he warily pricked at the gate with his little finger to see 
what happens, it was rather a momentary grabbing of the pale 
with his hands as an instantaneous prelude to the ensuing motion 
of his body's barging through the gate. In this spirit, therefore, 
substituting leaning for touching cannot be faulted for being too 
arbitrary or unjustified. Thirdly and most importantly, the state 
versus movement dichotomy may be deceptively misleading when 
looked at only superficially. What is really the issue is a state of 
possessing a particular property named by the adjective open. 
But as the analysis o far should have made it amply clear, this 
particular instance of the use of this adjective denotes in fact not 
a categorical property but a dispositional one (see Mumford or 
 Molnar). Dispositions are, in contrast to categorical ones, a kind 
of properties the possession of which by their host substance 
cannot be indisputably confirmed till the critical moment of its 
actual manifestation, after which point the substance may very 
well lose that very disposition. Examples are such as fragility 
possessed by a wineglass and solubility of salt: we cannot be 
one hundred percent certain that that particular glass will break 
when dropped because for all we know it is a very carefully 
crafted fake made of unbreakable plastic. The only way to be 
certain that it indeed possesses the fragility we hypothesize it has 
is to actually drop it. After it hits the floor and really shatters 
into pieces, there is no longer that particular fragility because the
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glass itself no longer exists. Similarly with salt: we do not know 
definitively that it will dissolve (it may be some non-water-
soluble powder similar in appearance to salt) until we put it into 
water. (In this case, however, after evaporating water away, salt 
will regain its solubility.) The property Benjy ascribes to the gate 
(which he describes by using the adjective open) is one example 
of such dispositional properties. As repeatedly noted above, the 
open-ness of the gate was for Benjy not something visually as-
certainable. The function of when I touched it is precisely what 
the conditional clause does in the paraphrasing of a dispositional 
property using conditional sentences, namely, stating the condi-
tion which triggers the manifestation of the dispositional prop-
erty. The unlatched gate had the disposition to open when leant 
on by someone and it manifested this disposition when indeed 
Benjy leaned on it. When this formal framework of translating 
dispositional properties in non-dispositional terms is seen to be 
adequate, we should have little worries left as to the plausibility 
of the rewriting proposed earlier in this paragraph. 
 Now we can finally go back to the questionable line of argu-
mentation we wanted to dissect earlier. For the convenience of 
reference, we cite it again below slightly abridged: 
   First, 'It was open when I touched it' is tantamount to his 
   confessing that he recognized that it was open. Second,to 
   recognize that it was open, he should be able to understand 
   what it is for it to be open. Thirdly, to understand what it 
   is for the gate to be open is precisely to know how it caus-
   ally comes about to be open. And finally, therefore,Benjy 
   understands the causal mechanism of how the gate opens. 
To start with, the first point is rather ambiguous; if the recogni-
tion it mentions is the sort implicitly presumed throughout the 
long paragraph above, it is acceptable, i. e., recognition through
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tactual / prioperceptive senses of the fact that the gate had pos-
sessed a dispositional property which by the very act of his dis-
covering it has already been lost (the gate has already opened 
itself: the disposition to open itself is lost when it becomes 
 open). If, on the contrary, something more is implied by his rec-
ognition, we have failed to see the evidence for it so far; hence 
a very likely non-sequitur. Next, the second point is either trivial 
or contentious; if the latter, we feel again suspicious of non-
sequitur though not certain exactly how because the point is once 
again rather vaguely put. The former possibility has nothing to 
object to except hat it is rather trivial, saying in effect that for 
Benjy to be able to recognize it to be open, he should know it 
to be open when it is open. As far as we know, there is no evi-
dence that he cannot do this: in him, there is no gap between 
recognition and knowledge. With this trivial interpretation i  
mind, the third point above is a blatant non-sequitur: to know the 
gate to be open when it is open does not in any way entail 
knowing the causal process by which the gate opens: to know 
open is to know the gate to be un-shut, in other words, it is un-
derstanding the particular state the gate can be in; to know the 
causal mechanism of opening is something properly beyond mere 
understanding of particular states. The two states of open and 
shut are merely points in the four dimensional event ontology, 
but the causal relation that connects the two are the line conjoin-
ing those points and even something more, something that ex-
plains and causally makes sense of the two events which 
otherwise are isolated, disjoint and not made sense of. In short, 
one may understand the states which may happen to be causes 
or effects in isolation, by themselves, without knowing anything 
about the causal relation that may obtain between them and con-
nect them. And finally, since the fourth and final point depends 
crucially on the previous steps, it itself now appears eriously
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wanting in plausibility. It is thus hoped that we are now less 
easily moved by arguments of the form as in the last paragraph, 
alleging to establish Benjy's causal understanding. 
 Taking the implication of the dispositional analysis to heart, 
we must not underestimate the point that Benjy's noticing of the 
dispositional property concerned is after the fact, that is, by the 
time his mind registers it, the said property is already lost. One 
suggestive way to capture this aspect of the dynamic involved, 
dealing with the fleeting reality, is to call Benjy's statements con-
cerning his touching and opening the gate post-hoc, post-actum 
confirmatory observational statements, in other words, assertions 
made after the fact, merely confirming or recording what has 
preceding-ly transpired. There does not entail from this that he 
shows much understanding of the causal mechanism involved in 
opening the gate nor what it means as an act for someone to 
open the gate except for, in his case, that it is a part of the im-
pediment that is in the way between him and the schoolgirls, i.e., 
the fence. 
 Finally, we quote from David Hume who in an appealing way 
explains how our mind, facing the external reality, develops the 
picture of a causally connected world: 
   The first time a man saw the communication of motion by 
   impulse, as by the shock of two billiard-balls, he would not 
   pronounce that the one event was connected; but only that it 
   was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several 
   instances of this nature, he then pronounces them connected 
   What alteration has happened to give rise to thisnew idea 
   of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to 
   be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the 
   existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we 
   say, therefore, that one object is connected with another,we 
   mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in thought,
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   and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs 
   of each other's existence. (Enquiry 75-76) 
What he means may cautiously be interpreted as a recognition of 
the indispensable role that repetition plays in elevating what was 
initially a mere conjunction to a connexion, and this connexion 
is what our human mind perceives as causality. In the case of 
Benjy and his opening the gate, we have already mentioned that 
there is no other instance in the text, our sentence is their unique 
co-occurrence; and only one other instance where somebody else 
(his sister Caddy) is opening the gate. Are those two instances 
sufficient o ensconce in his mind the connexion Hume is talking 
about? Not likely. Moreover, if we remind ourselves of the deep 
chasm separating first-person and third-person, perhaps we should 
not count Caddy's opening the gate as offering any additional 
reason for Benjy to understand his himselfs opening the gate. To 
repeat, the sentence we are considering is the one and only time 
where his interior monologue utters I opened the gate. We have, 
therefore, a strong case against he claim that Benjy possesses a
clear causal understanding about the gate's being opened by him 
since the Humean analysis does not seem to endorse it. 
 We have now reached the conclusion of our paper. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of unconditionally denying Benjy 
the very possibility of intentionality at all, we can be reasonably 
confident that a skeptical stance concerning his causal under-
standing as far as his opening the gate is concerned has an un-
deniable strength; succinctly put, he seems to lack the causal 
understanding involving the gate and himself. 
 As a corollary to this result, we see that Bockting, so far as 
this sentence is concerned, is rescued out of the outright contra-
diction we saw at the beginning, threatening her thesis about 
Benjy's causal non-understanding due to his not having mastered 
the use of transitive verbs in English.
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